The aim of this study is to examine the relationship between board composition and ownership structure variables on the level of voluntary information disclosures of companies listed on the Egyptian Stock Exchange. Board composition is examined in terms of board independence; board size; and CEO duality; also, ownership structure is examined in terms of ownership concentration; institutional ownership; and managerial ownership. The results show that there is a significant negative relationship between CEO duality and voluntary disclosures. However, board independence; board size; ownership concentration; institutional ownership; and managerial ownership are not associated with voluntary disclosures. Also, the results of the regression analyses show that size and leverage of firms are significantly and positively associated with the level of voluntary information disclosures. Profitability of a firm is not significantly associated with voluntary disclosures. Finally, this paper indicates the relationship among board composition, ownership structure and corporate voluntary disclosure, and provides evidence for Egyptian regulators to improve corporate governance and optimize ownership structure.
Introduction
Emerging markets have become the focus of international corporations, personal and institutional investors due to their high rates of economic growth (Millar et al., 2005) . However, they suffer from low investor protection practices, especially expropriation of minority shareholders both by managers and controlling shareholders (Gonenc and Aybar, 2006) . They have higher information asymmetry between managers and investors (Gul and Leung, 2004; Chau and Gray, 2010) , and have lower level of disclosure than those in developed market economies (Salter, 1998; Wang et al., 2008; and Tower et al., 2011) , whereas high-growth firms need more voluntary disclosure than low-growth firms due to their need for external finance (Core, 2001) .
At the same time, when the owner's holding increases, convergence of interest between the controlling shareholders and outside investors occurs. When investment decisions are more likely to be made to maximize the insiders' wealth, at the expense of outside investors, outsiders will find it necessary to supervise owner managers by increasing the extent of disclosures (Chau and Gray, 2010) . Board of director composition and company ownership structure are acknowledged to be important governance mechanisms. The present corporate governance literature recognizes that importance, however, the impact of board composition and ownership structure on corporate voluntary disclosure practices, remains unexplored in emerging stock markets.
There has been considerable number of researches on the relationship between board composition; and ownership structure on the level of voluntary disclosure. However most of these researches have been concentrated on developed countries and unfortunately what is true for a developed country can be completely different for a developing country or vice versa. Therefore motivation of this study is to examine the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual reports and web-sites of companies and to find out whether the variables of board composition and ownership structure have found to be significant in explaining voluntary disclosure practices in developed countries apply in a developing country such as Egypt. Therefore, the problem discussed in this study is exemplified through answering the following question: what are the impacts of board composition and ownership structure on enhancement of the level of voluntary disclosure in the more active 50 non-financial companies listed at Egyptian stock exchange?
In this study, board composition is examined in terms of board independence; board size; and CEO duality, also, ownership structure is examined in terms of ownership concentration; institutional ownership; and managerial ownership. To analyse the level of voluntary disclosure, we built an index through a list of items, within six categories. We employed multivariate regressions to examine the determinants of voluntary disclosure and its different categories. In our work an important aspect is the definition of "voluntary disclosure". Consistently with prior definitions in different regulatory national environments (Meek et al., 1995; Depoers, 2000 ; Allegrini and Greco, 2013), we consider voluntary disclosure as the information released to the outside deriving from management's insider knowledge of the company, which are not required to be published in regulated reports. Voluntary disclosure is, therefore, produced by a management's reporting decision (Meek et al., 1995; Healy and Palepu, 2001; and Allegrini and Greco, 2013) .
This study proceeds as follows. The next section provides a literature review and development of hypothesis. Section three describes the methodology, and the data. Section four reports the empirical results and the robustness checks. Finally, section five concludes the paper.
Literature Review and Development of Hypothesis
Corporate voluntary disclosure and its determinants have been identified as an important research area and have attracted both analytical and empirical researchers in accounting since the 1970s. Analytical research includes agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) , signaling theory (Hughes, 1986 ) and competition theory (Verrecchia, 1983) . In the literature, a number of studies have been undertaken to examine the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and voluntary disclosure. Corporate governance mechanisms, examined in these studies, include ownership structure, board composition, and the audit committee characteristics. Ho and Wong (2001) examined the relationship between four major corporate governance mechanisms and the extent of voluntary disclosures in Hong Kong. The results showed that the existence of an audit committee, is significantly and positively related to the extent of voluntary disclosure, while the percentage of family members on the board, is negatively related to the extent of voluntary disclosure. Eng and Mak (2003) examined the relationship between ownership structure and voluntary disclosures in Singapore. Their results revealed a significant negative relation between managerial ownership and level of voluntary disclosure, and a significant positive relation between government ownership and voluntary disclosure. However, they found no significant association between blockholder ownership and voluntary disclosures. Makhija and Patton (2004) examined the impact of ownership structure, on the extent of voluntary financial disclosure by Czech firms. They found that the extent of disclosure is positively related to investment fund ownership, at low levels of fund ownership but is negatively related to investment fund ownership at high levels of ownership. Barako, et al, (2006) examined the association between various corporate governance variables and voluntary corporate disclosure in Kenya. The results showed that the existence of an audit committee, foreign ownership, institutional ownership, firm size and leverage, have a significant positive relation with the level of voluntary disclosures. Ghazali and Weetman (2006) address the relationship between ownership and voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Malaysian companies. They outline several aspects of ownership, ownership concentration (the 10 largest shareholders), number of shareholders, director ownership and governmental ownership. They conclude that director ownership is significantly negatively associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure. On the other hand they report that other aspects of ownership are found to have insignificant association with the extent of voluntary disclosure. Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) reported clear evidence that voluntary disclosure increases with the number of nonexecutive directors on the board. Firms that have a nonexecutive chairman make greater voluntary disclosures than other firms. Also, their results showed there is no association between the extent of voluntary disclosure and ownership structure. Samaha and Dahawy (2012) examined the impact of a comprehensive set of corporate governance attributes on the extent of corporate governance voluntary disclosure in Egypt. Their results showed that the extent of governance disclosure is lower for companies with duality in position and higher ownership concentration as measured by blockholder ownership and increases with the proportion of independent directors on the board and also firm size. Alves et al., (2012) , examined the relations between corporate governance variables and voluntary disclosure in Portugal and Spain. Their results indicated that the main determinants of voluntary disclosure are firm size, growth opportunities, organizational performance, board compensation and the presence of a large shareholder. Fama (1980) suggested that the board of directors, which is elected by the shareholders, is the central internal control mechanism for monitoring managers. In this study board of directors characteristics include board independence; board size; and CEO Duality. Fama (1980) suggested that the board of directors, which is elected by the shareholders, is the central internal control mechanism for monitoring managers. Chau and Gray (2010) suggest that boards with a higher proportion of outside or independent directors will increase the quality of monitoring over management, because "they are not related to the company as officers or employees, and thus are independent representatives of the shareholders' interests" (Penno., 1997) .
Board Composition and Voluntary Disclosure

Board Independence and Voluntary Disclosure
Empirical results show a positive correlation between the proportion of independent directors on the board and the amount of voluntary information disclosed by the companies (Chen and Jaggi In Egypt, there is no rule or criterion to choose the independent non-executive directors. In most cases it depends on the previous relationship between the candidate and the chairman or executive directors. At the same time, in the Egyptian situation, Samaha and Dahawy (2011) find that the relationship between board independence and voluntary disclosure in Egypt is positive. In view of the mixed evidence from literature, the hypothesis relating board independence to voluntary disclosure is as follows:
H1. There is a significant positive relationship between the proportion of board independence and the level of voluntary disclosure.
Board Size and Voluntary Disclosure
Agency theory suggests that large boards can play an important role in monitoring the board and in making strategic decisions. In addition, it suggests that large boards are less likely to be controlled by the management (Hossain, and Reaz, 2007) . Furthermore, large boards lead to increase the expertise diversity in the board including financial reporting expertise (Yermack, 1996; and Laksmana, 2008) .
Majority of previous studies find a positive relationship between board size and voluntary disclosure (Barako et al., 2006; and Laksmana, 2008) . On the other hand, some studies did not find any relationship between board size and disclosure (Evans, 2004; and Lakhal, 2005) . In the Egyptian situation, Ezat and El-Masry (2008) find that board size is positively connected with levels of corporate voluntary disclosure. In view of the mixed evidence from literature, the hypothesis relating board size to voluntary disclosure is as follows:
H2. There is a significant positive relationship between the board size and the level of voluntary disclosure.
CEO Duality and Voluntary Disclosure
Fama and Jensen (1983) point out that CEO duality signals the absence of separation of decision control and decision management. The result of CEO duality is the concentration of decision-making power, which could constrain board independence and reduce its ability to execute its oversight and governance roles and prove detrimental to disclosure levels and quality, especially voluntary disclosure (Ho and Wong, 2001) .
Previous research on the relationship between duality in position and corporate voluntary disclosure is mixed. Some studies find a negative relationship between the two variables (Lakhal, (2008) find that dual role is negatively connected with levels of corporate voluntary disclosures, but the relationship is not statistically important at an acceptable level. Based on the above dissection, this study suggests that firms with CEO duality are more likely to be associated with lower levels of voluntary disclosures. The hypothesis is thus:
H3. There is a significant negative relationship between the CEO duality and the level of voluntary disclosure.
Ownership Structure and Voluntary Disclosure
Although ownership structure has been examined as an explanatory variable of disclosure level in previous disclosure studies (Raffournier, 1995 in Switzerland and Depoers, 2000 in France), the increasing attention to corporate governance has added to its importance. In this study, ownership structure include ownership concentration; institutional ownership; and managerial ownership.
Ownership Concentration and Voluntary Disclosure
The ownership variable is relevant to explain transparency, because when ownership is highly concentrated, there is less demand of information (Arcay and Vázquez, 2005) . Agency theory suggests that companies will disclose more information where there is diffused ownership (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Compared to companies with concentrated ownership, there is greater potential for agency conflict with diffuse ownership since the divergence of interests between the contracting parties is likely to be wider. Disclosure may reduce agency costs since it helps solve the monitoring problems experienced by diffuse owners. Omran et al., (2008) argue that the ownership concentration phenomenon is due to several factors. It is a response to the legal system which does not protect the minority investors. In the developing countries, ownership concentration may also be due to the nature of their poorly developed financial markets. Bushman et al., (2004) argue that firms with a concentrated ownership structure are less motivated to disclose as long as the shareholders of these companies can obtain information directly from the company. Similarly, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) assert the existence of a negative relationship between ownership concentration and disclosure extent. Therefore, information voluntary disclosure is likely to be more intense in the private enterprises with a largely diffused capital. In general, previous studies have found a negative association between ownership concentration and the extent of voluntary disclosure. It is assumed that the shareholding dissemination increases both the agency conflicts and the information asymmetry. In the light of what precedes, we formulate the following hypothesis.
H4. There is a significant negative relationship between ownership concentration and the level of voluntary disclosure.
Institutional ownership and Voluntary Disclosure
Institutional investors generally hold a large portion of shares in large companies. The extent of their property allows them to be the most important players in the structure of corporate governance. Thus, these investors are privileged to have an informational benefit over the minority shareholders. Furthermore, they have an advantage in obtaining private information (Raïda and Hamadi, 2012) .
The relationship between institutional ownership and voluntary disclosure has been examined in prior studies, the evidence is mixed. Barako In Egypt, the percentage of institutional ownership, in Egypt, has increased over the last few years.
One of the reasons of this increase is that the large privatization deals were mainly conducted by institutions (Abdel Shahid, 2003) . In view of the mixed evidence from literature, the hypothesis relating ownership concentration to voluntary disclosure is as follows:
H5. There is a significant positive relationship between the institutional ownership and the level of voluntary disclosure.
Managerial Ownership and Voluntary Disclosure
The managerial ownership came to reduce the agency problems and the managerial opportunism caused by the separation between ownership and control. When the managerial ownership is high, the agency conflicts between the shareholders administrators and the shareholders non administrators prevail but not the conflicts between the managers and the shareholders.
Baek et al., (2009) find that, for firms with low levels of managerial ownership, there is a negative relationship between the level of managerial ownership and the level of disclosure (Raïda and Hamadi, 2012) . In an Egyptian situation, Samaha and Dahawy (2011) find a negative relationship between the ownership of management and the voluntary corporate disclosures made by the top 30 Egyptianlisted companies. Thus, we expect that voluntary disclosure in the annual reports increases with decreases in managerial ownership. We suggest, then, testing the following hypothesis.
H6. There is a significant negative relationship between managerial ownership and the level of voluntary disclosure.
Research design
Sample
The sample in the current study consists of the Egyptian companies from amongst the top 50 most active-traded companies listed in the Egyptian Stock Exchange over the period [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] . Following the majority of disclosure literature (e.g. Wallace and Naser, 1995; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; and Ghazali and Weetman, 2006) financial companies; e.g. banks, insurance companies, and leasing companies; were excluded from the sample due to the different requirements of disclosure and corporate governance. Hence their annual reports may be not comparable to those of other companies. This gave us a sample of 40 firms. As no relevant Data Stream exists in Egypt, the annual reports, covering the four year period 2007-2010, were purchased from the Egyptian Company for Information Dissemination (EGID) to extract the information on the variables needed to test each of the research hypotheses. Also, this study used the companies' web-sites for collecting data.
Construction of the disclosure Index
The voluntary disclosure index (VDISCL) 2006) . Common to these studies is that they focus on investors' needs. The disclosure index is based on the following six categories: strategy, market and competition, management and production, marketing, future perspective and human capital. A score sheet was designed for scoring firms on the amount and the level of detail of disclosures. A total of 60 indicators within the six groups have been identified (See appendix A). The disclosure index is un-weighted as it assumes that each indicator of each disclosure category is equally important . The disclosure level of a company was calculated by dichotomous procedure which assigns a score of 1 if a corporation discloses an item and a score of 0 if it does not (Cooke, 1989; Gul and Leung, 2004; and Hossain and Hammami, 2009 ). For each firm, a disclosure index was computed as the ratio of the actual score given to the firm divided by the maximum score. Accordingly, the voluntary disclosure index for each company was calculated as follows (Cooke, 1989 ; and Hossain and Hammami, 2009): VDISCL = ∑ (1) Where: VDISCL is voluntary Disclosure index level, dj = 1 if the item j is disclosed; 0 if the item j is not disclosed; n is number of items.
This study proceed to the validation of the voluntary disclosure index, following Botosan (1997) , based on the following points: comparison with similar studies using voluntary disclosure indexes; positive statistically significant correlations between the number of analysts and the voluntary disclosure scores; an accepted value for the Cronbach's alpha coefficient; and similar results with previous studies of the correlation between the voluntary disclosure level and firm characteristics.
Controlling Variables
The firm size (FSIZ) is considered as the one of the most important variables related with the level of transparency and disclosure (Lang and Lundholm, 1993) . Several authors find evidence of a positive relationship between the size of the firm and the release of information (Botosan and Plumlee, 2002) . Size is measured as the logarithm of total assets to reduce the effect of inaccurate data in the statistical analysis. This measure of size is frequently used, such as in the studies of Lim et al., (2007) , and Raïda and Hamadi, (2012) . Also, the results concerning the relationship between information disclosure and the firm leverage (FLEV) are not agreeable. Some authors find a positive relationship between the two variables and others found a negative relation. In this study, leverage is measured by the ratio of total debt/total assets, like in the studies of Depoers (2000) , and Baek et al., (2009). Finally, Signaling theory suggests that managers of firms with good performance are motivated to disclose additional information in order to signal quality of management. Empirical evidence indicates mixed results in the relationship between the extent of disclosure in company annual reports and profitability. In this study, profitability (PROF) is measured by return on asset.
Definition of Variables
The explanations of dependent; independent and control variables are presented in Table 1 There are a number of companies that were in the top 50 most active-traded companies listed in the Egyptian Stock Exchange in 2007 that are not in 2010 raising concerns regarding the effect that nonsurviving firms have on the results. To control the effect of non-survivorship firms on the results, a dumpy variable (FSUR) is created which is equal to 1 if the firm is continuously present in all the years of the sampling period from 2007 to 2010, otherwise it is equal to 0.
Model development
In order to examine the relationship between board composition; ownership structure variables and the extent of voluntary information disclosures of Egyptian companies, the following multiple regression model is estimated: VDISCL = β0+β1BIND + β2BSIZ + β3CEOD + β4OCON + B5INOW+ B6MAOW + B7CSIZ + B8LEV + B9PRO + β10FSUR + ε (2) Where: VDISCL, voluntary disclosure index level; BIND, board independence; BSIZ, board size; CEOD, CEO-duality; OCON, ownership concentration; INOW, institutional ownership; MAOW, managerial ownership; CSIZ, company size; LEV, leverage; PRO, profitability; FSUR, firm survival; and ε, the error term, normally distributed about a mean of 0. Table regarding the composition of the board of directors, the average ratio of independent directors is (72%). The results also, reveal that the maximum size of board of directors was 13 members, while the minimum size was 4 members at the end of year, and the average was 6, 67. The data also shows that nearly 47% of the firms have their chairman who also acts as CEO duality.
Results discussion
Descriptive statistics
Regarding the ownership structure variables, Table 2 shows that the average ratio of ownership concentration is (53%). The data also shows that, nearly (52.43%) of the sample firms owned by institutional investors with a standard deviation of 0.301. Finally, it appears from the Table regarding managerial ownership that the average is (24.81%) with a standard deviation of 0.1641. Table 3 presents the correlation matrix of the dependent and independents variables, from which, it has been observed that the highest simple correlation between independent variables was 0.447 between ownership concentration (OCON) and managerial ownership (MAOW). Bryman and Cramer (1997) suggest that simple correlation between independent variables should not be considered harmful until they exceed 0.80 or 0.90. This confirms that there is no multicollinearity among the variables. 
Multivariate analysis
As in many previous disclosure studies, regression analysis has been preferred to investigate the relationship between board composition and ownership structure on the voluntary disclosure level of Egyptian companies. Results of an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression in Table 4 show that the Fratio is 13.49 (P = 0.00). The result statistically supports the significance of the model. Also, we found that the value of the coefficient of determination R square of the model is equal to 0.504, and this means that 50.4% of the variance of the independent variable explained by the independent variables included in the model. The other 49.6% of the variance that occur in the level of disclosure in financial reports was a result of other variables. The further confirmation of mutlitolinearity assumption is checked by variance inflation factor (VIF). The (VIF) in excess of 10 should be considered an indication of harmful multicollinearity (Neter et al., 1989) . Table 4 shows that the average VIF (1.32) is close to 1 and this confirms that collinearity is not a problem for this model. These findings suggest that multicollinearity between the independent variables is unlikely to pose a serious problem in the interpretation of the results of the multivariate analysis. Table 4 provides the results of the OLS regression for the model using the stepwise method. Firm characteristics including firm size; profitability; and age of firm have positive and significant relationship with voluntary disclosure index. While auditor size has positive but insignificant relationship with voluntary disclosure index. Unless otherwise noted, the following discussion refers to the normal scoresregression results which are in complete agreement from the rank regression results.
Results of Regression Model
The findings in Table 3 and 4 of multivariate analysis suggest that the extent of total voluntary disclosure decrease with the higher percentage of board independence. This result is consistent with the finding of Eng and Mak (2003) and Barako et al., (2006) who provide evidence of negative significant association of outside directors on the board and voluntary disclosure in Singapore and Kenya respectively. However, it is in contrast to the findings of Chen and Jaggi (2000) and Cheng and Courtenay (2006) who document positive association and also in contrast with Haniffa and Cooke (2002) who report negative but insignificant association. The different findings may be attributed to the different role that non-executive directors play on the board in different countries. The members of the board are selected by the main shareholders, block holders, or the chairman of the board. As such non-executive directors may know each other as well as knowing the directors of the company before appointment. Consequently, their independence that may lead to the expected high level of disclosure and transparency is questionable. The findings of the current study confirm these arguments especially in emerging capital markets and developing countries. Table 3 and 4 show that there is a negative relation between the independence of board of directors in the Egyptian most active fifty companies and the level of disclosure in financial reports , but with no statistical evidence (p-value = 0.601 ˃ 0.05), therefore the hypothesis H1 is rejected. The empirical evidence derived from the regression model results in Table 3 and 4 indicate that board size is statistically related to the level of voluntary disclosure by the sample of companies in their annual reports. But it is non-significant at .05% level. This finding lends nonsupport to Hypothesis 2. The explanation of this positive association may be based on the expertise diversity on the board; including financial reporting expertise; that provides greater knowledge base. With such knowledge base the members are willing to legitimize themselves and their company by disclosing more information voluntarily as a signal directed to the stakeholders. The finding is contradictory to the evidence presented by Arcay and Vazquez (2005) and Cheng and Courtenay (2006) of no association between board size and the level of voluntary disclosure.
The hypothesis H3 predicted statistical negative relation between CEO duality and voluntary disclosure. This study result supports the previous hypothesis. The results in Table 3 In this study the results of the multipleregression proved that there is a negative relation between ownership concentration and the level of disclosure in the financial reports but with no statistical evidence (p-value = 0.426 ˃ 0.05), and the value of the regression coefficient is negative therefore, the hypothesis H 4 is rejected. The results of insignificance of ownership concentration in explaining disclosure in annual reports are similar to those found in either developed (Depoers, 2000) or emerging capital markets (Ghazali and Weetman, 2006) . However, the insignificant negative association between ownership concentration and voluntary disclosure is inconsistent with the findings of Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Barako et al., (2006) .
Previous researches by Samaha and Dahawy (2011) indicated a negative relation between institutional ownership and voluntary disclosure, while Haniffa and Cooke (2002) found a positive relation. In this study, the results of the multipleregression in Table 3 and 4 showed a negative relation between the institutional ownership of the most active fifty companies and the level of disclosure in the financial reports but with no statistical evidence (pvalue = 0.533 ˃ 0.05) therefore, the hypothesis H5 is rejected. However, the study result is contradictory to the evidence provided by Barako et al., (2006) ; in Kenya; and Guan et al., (2007) in Taiwan; who provide evidence for the positive association between institutional ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure. It is also contrast to the negative association reported by Schadewitz and Blevins (1998) in Finnish firms. The non-significant association between financial institutional ownership and voluntary disclosure in the current study may be attributable to the accessibility of information that financial institutional investors have through their representative on the board.
Early studies by Samahs and Dahawy (2011) show a relation between the ownership of management and the voluntary corporate disclosure made by the top 30 Egyptian-listed companies. In this study as show in Table 3 and 4 the results of the multiple-regression showed a relation between the ownership of management of the public Egyptian companies and the level of disclosure in the financial reports but with no statistical evidence (p-value = 0.090 ˃ 0.05) and the value of the regression coefficient is negative therefore, the hypothesis H6 is rejected. This result is inconsistent with Meek et al., (1995) in their findings that the extent of shareholding by management is positively associated with the amount of information disclosed about earnings.
Finally, regarding the control variables, the results in Table 3 Table 3 and 4 show that there is a positive relation between leverage and the level of disclosure in the financial reports with statistical evidence. The results are consistent with the evidence of some studies find a positive relationship between the two variables (Taylor et al., 2008) . Also, the results of the multiple-regression proved that there is a positive relation between profitability and the level of disclosure in the financial reports with no statistical evidence. The results are consistent with other studies provide evidence of insignificance relationship between profitability and disclosure (Meek et al., 1995) .
Conclusion
This study reports on the level of voluntary disclosure of a sample of non-financial Egyptian firms listed on the Egyptian Stock Exchange over the period 2007-2010 and, then investigates the association between board composition and ownership structure on the level of voluntary disclosure. Unweight disclosure index, compiled of 60 voluntary items, and was computed for each firm. The study found that firms, on average, report 0.32 percent of the voluntary information. The low disclosure level most likely relates to the fact that this type of information is voluntary in nature, and no existing disciplines set out by the authoritative accounting and reporting bodies in Egypt require public firms to display such information. In other words, voluntary disclosure is left to the discretion of management. Further, in an effort to examine the relationship between board composition and ownership structure on the voluntary disclosure level, the results show that there is a significant negative relationship between CEOduality ownership and voluntary disclosures. However, board independence; board size; ownership concentration; institutional ownership; and managerial ownership are not associated with voluntary disclosures. Also, the results of the regression analyses show that size and leverage of firms are significantly and positively associated with the level of voluntary information disclosures. Profitability of a firm is not significantly associated with voluntary disclosures. This study recommends to management and auditors of Egyptian companies to improve the quality and reporting of voluntary disclosure in their annual reports. This will enhance the confidence of their investors, satisfying their creditors and customers, improve their profitability and value of shares.
As with any research, this study has some limitations. The following limitations are the most pertinent. First, the items constituting the disclosure index were subjectively assembled from three prior studies. The choice of the items, however, does not reflect their level of importance as perceived by financial information users. Second, annual reports have been used as the sole source of data gathering, others such as web sites and press releases could be used in for non-listed companies. Finally, this study is using a small sample of 40 companies. This sample may be small in size and, by construction, composed of the most active Egyptian listed companies and thus may not be representative of the population of Egyptian firms, consequently, caution should be considered in evaluating the results. Thus, it might have been better to look at companies from a wider range.
